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INTRODUCTION

Truth is central to any lawyer's vocation. Legal advocates
are cautioned that falsehoods are not only destructive to the
justice system, but also to the soul. Acceptable legal advocacy
can be tenacious, innovative, and creative, but not at the expense
of justice and truth. Falsehoods of every sort are vociferously
ccndemned by St. Thomas Aquinas. Lawyers are not to be a
party to any unjust law, for to advocate the merits of an unjust
law is to advance injustice. Unjust laws bind neither lawyer nor
client.
At trial or other legal proceedings, the lawyer needs to
refrain from all falsehoods, suspicion, rumor, calumny, collusion
and evasion. Those who engage in such tactics should be barred
from the practice of law. If he or she is meritorious and factually
grounded, Thomas insists that the lawyer aggressively pursue
defense and prosecution using the wits given to him by God.
These general insights extend to witnesses, the presentation of
t This chapter is reprinted by permission of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc.,
and will be forthcoming as Chapter 9, "Law, Justice, Lawyers and Advocates,"
in AQUINAS IN THE COURTROOM: LAWYERS, JUDGES AND JUDICIAL
CONDUCT, by Charles P. Nemeth. This text will be made available in
hardcover through Greenwood Press and paperback through Praeger Press in
August of 2001.
* Professor of Criminal Justice, the State University of New York at Brockport;
Member of the Pennsylvania, New York, and North Carolina Bars.
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evidence, and candor toward the tribunal. In sum, Thomas's
portrait of a lawyer contains professional competencies, but more
compellingly, a picture of the moral agent dedicated to virtue and
truth.
I.

THE LAWYER IN THOMISTIC JURISPRUDENCE

Lawyers do not escape Thomistic scrutiny, and are a topic of
enormous importance in the legal theory of Thomas. Just as
human law is necessary, laudatory, and foundational to
civilization, so too is the lawyer who interprets, advocates, or
challenges the legitimacy of any law. Lawyers specialize in the
law as an instrument, in procedural and substantive legal
settings. Employing the law as promulgation or act is only the
starting point. Law, aside from being a juridical act, is by its
proper nature, an ordination of reason and the subject of virtuous
conduct. The foremost of such conduct is the virtue of justice
itself. Lawyers clamoring for justice do so in a holistic sense,
rather than upon the urging of individual clients. Lawyers, when
carrying out their tasks correctly, remember the comprehensive
definition Thomas attributes to law, which is avoiding individual
preference, and retaining a rational prescription for the whole,
for the good, for the universe. Thomas perceives the practice of
law in both secular and spiritual terms. When deciding whether
or not a lawyer should take or charge a fee for his or her
advocacy, Thomas states, "[tihough knowledge of law is
something spiritual, the use of that knowledge is accomplished
by the work of the body: hence it is lawful to take money in
payment of that use, else no craftsman would be allowed to make
profit by his art."'
In this framework, lawyering is more than a series of
mechanical steps, it is a spiritual undertaking, entwined and
1 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA II-II, Q. 71, Art. 4, at 1499
(Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., 1947). Quod etsi scientia
juris sit quoddam spirituale,tamen usus ejus fit opere corporali;et ideo pro ejus
recompensatione licet pecuniam accipere; alioquin nulli artifici liceret de arte

sua lucrari. As J.V. Dolan points out, lawyers and their laws are meaningful
when the law retains "a certain universality and remain[s] at some distance
from the contingent singulars. It cannot become so completely configured to any
individual action as to destroy its usefulness as a measure for the others." J. V.
Dolan, Natural Law and Judicial Function, 16 LAVAL THEOLOGIQUE ET
PHILOSOPHIQUE 96 (1960).
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entangled in the mesh of man's intellect, reason, ends, goals,
natural law imprints, and the image of God's creation. Spouting
off legal maxims and principles while being slavishly attendant
to legal promulgations without the broader perspective offered by
Thomas is not the practice of law in the truest sense. The
practice of law, and lawyering itself, is a sojourn into the just and
unjust world of human existence. 2 Good lawyers use the cerebral
skills of an intelligent being, and are mindful of their spiritual
and rational makeup. Certainly, the truly proficient lawyer
develops superlative analytical talents, becomes a sterling orator,
excels in the tactics and techniques of the litigator, and
aggressively pursues the client's victory or position; though these
competencies only partially encompass the Thomistic lawyer.
More germane for Thomas is the permanent remembrance of
the hierarchical structure of law, descending down from the
Divine Exemplar, inherent and burned into our natural beings,
aided by divine revelation, and dependent upon the order that
emanates from nature and the positive laws enacted for the
common good. Lawyers, like every human agent, are subject to
this plan and need to submit their person and occupation to this
teleological approach. The state cannot neglect the purposes and
effects of the natural law since the natural law is given us "by the
mercy and wisdom of the truly Supreme Legislator."3
Lawyers, in Thomas's eyes, are more than dockyard bullies
who, if screaming loud enough, antagonizing opponents and
representing clients zealously enough, are aggressive victors. In
the contemporary courtroom, the search for truth is often
replaced and unfortunately vanquished by those whose message
rests on drama more than truth. Form over substance, fair over
right are catch phrases that replace the true and the good in law
and in lawyering. A client's rights or protections, just as a
lawyer's vocation, are not singularly grounded in the
promulgative reality, but in a law "that ought to be."4 The
lawyer's "role" is, at best, an amoral functionary, and Thomas
2 For an interesting analysis of lawyering being more than mere practice,
see generally Louis M. Brown & Thomas L. Shaffer, Toward a Jurisprudence
for the Law Office, 17 Am.J. JURIS. 125 (1972).
3 Igor Grazin, Natural Law as a Form of Legal Studies, 37 AM. J. JURIS. 1,
16 (1992).
4 J.V. Dolan, Natural Law & Modern Jurisprudence, 16 LAVAL
THEOLOGIQUE ET PHILOSOPHIQUE 44 (1990).

40 CATHOLIC LAWYER, No. 3

insists on much more.
To the dismay of our present justice system, modern legal
practice repeatedly witnesses lawyers who advocate claims
knowing of their falsity; represent cases thoroughly vacant in
merit; adopt litigation strategies that wear down opponents by
exhausting their resources; and orally argue avant garde, even
bizarre, legal arguments. And why not? For most contemporary
legal professionals, lawyering is about gamesmanship, tactics,
and victory for client and cause, with little care for the means
utilized.
Modern law schools speak of ethics in regulatory provisions
or case law determinations, not in the Thomistic ideal of truth,
teleology and justice. Justice is about what is right. Justice
concerns itself solely with right reason, virtue, human and
communal goods. Justice is not primarily about results tabulated
in a win-loss column. Lawyers, for Thomas, are in the business
of truth, not in a war of combatants or deceptive theatrical
performances. Thomas's comparison of a soldier to a legal
practitioner is instructive. A soldier in the midst of battle may be
deceptive but similar tactics by a lawyer/advocate are rejected:
As stated above... it is lawful for a soldier, or a general to
lay ambushes in a just war, by prudently concealing what
he has a mind to do, but not by means of fraudulent
falsehoods, since we should keep faith even with a foe, as
Tully says (De Offic. iii. 29). Hence it is lawful for an
advocate, in defending his case, prudently to conceal
whatever might hinder its happy issue, but it is unlawful
for him to employ any kind of falsehood.5
This sketch of the lawyer/advocate is consistent with
Thomas's overall view of human operations, inclinations and
dispositions. Lawyers are no different from other actors on the
world stage.
This generality, however, does not cause Thomas to hesitate
in laying out a blueprint for the legal profession. Eruditely,

5 AQUINAS, supra note 1, Q. 71, Art. 3, at 1499. Quod, sicut supra dictum
est, militi vel duci exercitus licet in bello justo ex insidiis agere, ea quae facere
debet prudentur occultando, non autem falsitatem fraudulenter faciendo, quia
etiam hosti fidem servare oportet, sicut Tullius dicit (in De offic. lib. I, in tit. De
bellicis offic. a med. et De fortitud. lib. III, circ. med.) Unde et advocato
defendenti causam justam licet prudenter occultare ea quibus impediri posset
processus ejus; non autem licet ei aliquafalsitate uti.
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Thomas addresses the practice of law from various vantagepoints.
Exactly how does a lawyer morally and ethically
advocate? How does truth serve as an ethical guidepost for the
lawyer? Does the virtue of justice guide the lawyer? Do acts of
injustice eventually transform the just lawyer into an unjust
person? Is there a relationship between injustice, falsehood,
immorality, and the condition of a lawyer's soul, or are these
injustices merely manifestations of a profession and not the
lawyer's own personhood? Is there a difference in professional
and ethical parameters for those representing defendants or
plaintiffs? How effective are lawyers in meting out justice by
giving what is due to others and equalizing the imbalances that
are inherent in civil harms and criminal wrongs?
Not
surprisingly, Thomas's job description for "lawyer" comprises
more than professional obligations and proficiencies, it also
includes a rich formula for the good life, since truth is annexed to
justice.6
II. THE LAWYER AS ADVOCATE

Delivering a legal argument, arguing for or against a
particular law, precedent, or statute, urging the adoption of a
specific principle in law or equity are the sum and substance of
the advocate. Lawyers perform a myriad of functions, which
throughout their professional careers will most assuredly include
legal argument. It is the business of the advocate to vigorously
represent a case or a client in their respective conditions and
circumstances. Vigor of representation however, is not a license
to act without moral parameters. "Zealous representation," a
"vigorous defense," "unfailing loyalty to client and case," and
being "a hired gun" for the defense or prosecution, are the
standard "shop" descriptions for the lawyer/advocate.
These
depictions primarily portray a role of touting or towing the line or
case argument within advocacy. Such bantering is an incomplete
inquiry into the nature of advocacy since the advocate need delve
into other underlying issues: 1) the meritorious basis for claim or
charge and, 2) the justness and justice in the claim or charge. In
other words, the advocate, before tuning up the vocal chords,
assesses the morality, the virtue and the end result of the case to
6

See id. Q. 80, Art. 1, at 1527.
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be advocated.
Lawyers, in Thomas's moral setting, cringe at false factual
averments and avoid any type of deliberate or selective ignorance
of facts. Lawyers are in the business of justice, and Thomistic
justice is not the province of victories and legal scorecards.
Adopting a tone of condemnation, Thomas chides the lawyer who
advocates the "unjust cause."7 "It is unlawful to co-operate in an
evil deed, by counseling, helping, or in any way consenting,
because to counsel or assist an action is, in a way, to do it ... "8
Imagine this view in the modern-day courtroom, where
lawyers stand lockstep with criminals known to be guilty or with
litigants whose cases are disingenuous at best. Shrouding
oneself in a cloak of ignorance about client and case is
unacceptable for those attuned to Thomas's jurisprudence.
Thomas's legal advocate is aggressive about both his profession
and those represented, as symbolized by his characterization of
those advocating an unjust cause as "ungodly."9. The ungodly
operate by means of chicanery, "fraudulent falsehoods,"10 and by
engaging in a perversion of "his art for an evil end."11 George
Friel interprets Thomas correctly:
If in the course of a suit, the advocate finds that his case is
unjust, he must give up the case, or induce his client to give
way, or make some compromise without prejudice to the
other side. In the course of a suit he may make use of all
prudent and honest means, e.g., by not revealing all the
truth, etc. On the other hand, he may never commit a
crime to save his client. In criminal cases he may defend
the criminal always, provided that he uses neither
fraudulency nor lies.12
For those laboring in the muck of institutionalized legal
practice, a policy of honesty and disclosure appears both naive
and incomprehensible.
For many, the legal system has
institutionalized, and thereby legitimized, a selectively disclosed
7 Id.

Q. 71, Art. 3, at 1498 (emphasis added).

8 Id. Quod illicitum est alicui cooperari ad malum faciendum, sive
consulendo, sive adjuvando, sive qualitercumque consentiendo, quia consilians
et coadjuvans quodammodo est faciens.

9 Id. Q. 71, Art. 3, at 1499.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 GEORGE

QUENTIN

FRIEL,

PUNISHMENT

IN THE

THOMAS AQUINAS AND AMONG SOME PRIMITIVE PEOPLES

PHILOSOPHY

138 (1939).

OF SAINT
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type of legal advocacy. It is a business not interested in putting
all the cards on the table, but instead hiding behind a lax
occupational positivism.
Cases and claims docketed in the
prothonotary's office, rarely press the advocate's conscience. For
the most part, today's attorneys are not mindful of the moral or
metaphysical connotations of law, as is the justice system itself.
The consequences of a legal culture and infrastructure dominated
by the positivist's ideal is far-reaching and has invaded law
school classrooms and courtrooms. 13 A lawyer's model gutted of
moral demands entices the bulk of advocates. Why should the
advocate care when legal pundits creatively cook-up new and
untested theories of injury and defense? Who can resist criminal
defenses of the sort invented in the last three decades, e.g.,
television addiction, post-partum blues, junk food compulsions,
astrologicalimbalances and sexual addiction? Advocacy without
moral consequences is nothing more than a mindless series of
movements and rationalizations. Thomas recoils at this narrow
view of lawyering since a lawyer's function must be "seen in its
full light, must be seen against the background of his teleological
conception of man and the universe ... to the rule or domain of
that higher law that leads all things to their final end or goal." 14
An unjust law is really not a law in the truest sense, and
therefore not obligatory. To advocate an unjust cause likewise is
contrary to justice itself, to the very idea of law as an ordination.
"[Llaw is binding in conscience only if it is law in the truest or
most essential sense, and, it is binding in conscience if it is law in
the essential sense because the essence or nature of law is
intimately bound up with justice."5 For Thomas's part, the
unjust advocate is an accomplice who sins so grievously that he
or she is "bound to restitution of the loss unjustly incurred by the
other party by reason of the assistance he has provided."' 6
Honesty toward and in the tribunal, a moral basis for case and
cause, and a rejection of unmeritorious cases, in these times
seems almost surreal. Gilson's remarks would fall on deaf ears
in today's legal community. "But a lawyer lacking morality
13 Dolan, supra note 4, at 44.
14 Robert J. Kreyche, Virtue and Law

in Aquinas: Some Modern
Implications, 15 Sw. J. PHIL. 113 (1974).
15 Edward J. Damich, The Essence of Law According to Thomas Aquinas, 30
AM. J. JURIS. 79, 81 (1985).
16 AQUINAS, supra note 1, Q. 71, Art. 3, at 1499.
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ought to be even more unthinkable, because no lawyer is allowed
to plead an unjust cause. If he does so in error and good faith, he
commits no fault. But if he knows that the cause he is defending
is unjust, he gravely offends against justice."17
The positivist attorney has only the cause, good or bad, to
hold onto.
Lawyers need more than the artificiality and
insubstantiality of promulgation and enactment.18
A just lawyer acts compatibly with reason, operates in
conformity with the natural law, strives for the life of virtue and
These
perpetually seeks the perfect good of all existence.
ingredients for the good and happy man are applicable to the
good and happy lawyer. 19
To the advocate, then, is the heady responsibility of
advocating in conformity with this plan, advocating not as an
automaton, but as a moral agent. Thomas labels this power
unique to rational creatures alone since the "rational creature
holds dominion over his acts, moving himself freely in order to
perform his actions."20 Only then will the advocacy bring about
what is due, what is right, assuring a "certain rectitude ... an
equality between things and persons."21
Thomas is realistic enough to forgive or excuse the advocate
who has been misled. As any lawyer discovers, a client's word is
often an abridged or slanted storyline.
The correctional
population of America, numbering in the millions, is uniformly
innocent, the inmates declare. While blind acceptance of a
client's vision of truth is unwise, Thomas withholds judgment
from those advocating a claim in good faith. This lack of
knowledge, or the client's delivery of inaccurate knowledge, may
be the foundation upon which the advocate develops a case
theory. Thomas excuses this to some extent: "If, however, he
defends an unjust cause unknowingly, thinking it just, he is to be

17 ETIENNE GILSON, THE CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY OF ST. THOMAS AoUINAS 320

(L.K. Shook trans., 1956).
18 For a persuasive discussion of how legal activity inevitably depends upon
moral certitude, see generally Henry Mather, Natural Law and Right Answers,
38 AM. J. JURIS. 297 (1993).
19 See James V. Schall, S.J., The Natural Law Bibliography, 40 AM. J.
JURIS. 157, 160 (1995).
20 THOMAS AQUINAS, SuMMA CONTRA GENTILES Book III, part II, Chap. 111,
1 (Vernon J. Bourke trans., 1975).
21 E. T.

Gelinas, Right and Law in

Thomas Aquinas, in

PHILOSOPHY 131 (George F. McLean ed., 1971).

MYTH AND
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excused according to the measure in which ignorance is
excusable."22
This toleration melts away when and if the advocate
determines that the theory of his advocacy is fraudulent or false.
Continued advocacy in the fraudulent cause is inexcusable and is
assuredly a systematic attack against "commutative justice, legal
3
justice, or at least against truth."2
Thomas recognizes that discovery of client/case falsehood
exacts a series of dilemmas on the practitioner and cautions the
advocate against the radical implications of immediate
withdrawal from representation. He also reinforces the need for
continued discretion in matters of privilege and confidentiality.
The advocate need not help the opposition even though the basis
of the advocacy has been altered by subsequent discovery of its
injustice. Thomas shows keen sensitivity to the due process
implications of withdrawn or substitute counsel: "[H]e ought not
to throw up his brief in such a way as to help the other side, or so
as to reveal the secrets of his client to the other party. But he
can and must give up the case, or induce his client to give way, or
make some compromise without prejudice to the opposing
party."24

As an officer of the court, the advocate, as described in
current parlance, should not advocate a case lacking in merit, 25
nor that which is injurious to the profession as a whole.
Thomas's benchmark for the just or unjust cause certainly
assures both the quality and integrity of both case and advocate.
III. THE LAWYER, TRUTH, AND FALSEHOOD
Because justice is concerned with the right and "expression
of right,"26 it is defined in terms of what is due, what is in balance
and in equilibrium, and is an expression and reflection of the
22 AQUINAS, supra note 1, Q. 71, Art. 3, at 1499. Si autem ignoranter
injustam causam defendit, putans esse justam, excusatur secundum modum quo
ignorantiaexcusari potest.
23 Michael Harding, True Justice in Courts of Law, in AQUINAS, supra note

1, at 3356.

24 AQUINAS, supra note 1, Q. 71, Art. 3, at 1499. Non debet eam prodere, ut
scilicet aliam partem juvet, vel secreta suae causae alteri parti revelet. Potest
tamen et debet causam deserere, vel eum cujus causam agit, ad cedendum
inducere,sive ad componendum sine adversariidamno.
25 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1999).
26 AQUINAS, supra note 1, Q. 57, Art. 1, at 1432.
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virtuous ordination of the human person. This emanates from
the Creator, impressing itself in the form of primary and
secondary principles of the natural law with truth at its core.
For the lawyer, truth is fittingly attributed to every aspect of law
and its practice. At various places in the Summa Theologica,
Thomas treats the opposite of truth-telling, dwelling upon:
falsehood, cheating in buying and selling,27 wilful deceit in the
transfer
of goods
and
services, 28 overstatement
and
unconscionability in the value of a thing,29 violation of vows, 30
oaths, 31 perjury, 32 and lying. 33 Thomas states that lying and
falsehood are opposed to truth, except in accidental cases. Lying,
"mendacium," is neither the product of negligence or
involuntariness, but a formal declaration of falsity in "opposition
to the mind"34 (contra mentem). A lie is contrary to charity when
it is in confrontation with justice and an inequity. 35
Dissimulation and hypocrisy are also vigorously condemned by
Thomas. Words, which are the sum and substance of lies and
falsehoods, represent one of many means to falsehood. Signs,
acts, and deeds that are disingenuous encompass falsity:
Accordingly just as it is contrary to truth to signify by
words something different from that which is in one's mind,
so also is it contrary to truth to employ signs of deeds or
things to signify the contrary of what is in oneself, and this
is what is properly denoted by dissimulation. Consequently
dissimulation is properly a lie told by the signs of outward
deeds. Now it matters not whether one lie in word or in any
other way, as stated above. Wherefore, since every lie is a
sin, as stated above, it follows that also all dissimulation is
a sin.36

See id. Q. 77.
See id. Q. 77, Art. 3, at 1515.
See id. Q. 77, Art. 4, at 1516.
30 See id. Q. 88, Art. 6, at 1517.
31 See id. Q. 89.
32 See id. Q. 98.
33 See id. Q. 110.
34 Id. Q. 110, Art. 1, at 1664.
35 See id. Q. 110, Art. 4, at 1668.
36 Id. Q. 111, Art. 1, at 1669. Ita etiam opponitur veritati quod aliquis per
aliqua signa factorum vel rerum aliquid significet contrarium ejus quod in eo
est, quod proprie simulatio dicitur. Unde simulatio proprie est mendacium
quoddam in exteriorum signis factorum consistens. Non refert autem utrum
aliquis mentiatur verbo, vel quocumque alio facto, ut supra habitum est. Unde
27
28
29
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Thomas's legal system depends on hard evidence, not
suspicion, rumor, and doubt. 37 Suspicion, for example, is nothing
more than a "perversity of the affections"38 that cannot lead to
the type of legal truth necessary for acquittal or conviction.
Dubious ideas should not control legal reasoning because lawyers
"strive to make [judgments in] accord with things as they are." 39
Truth has a hardness to it, be it the truth of temporality or
universality. Falsehood, deceit, and deception have no place in
Thomas's legal system, nor in his profile of the legal professional.
Falsehood implies an internal secrecy that is corrosive and
corruptive to both lawyers and individuals because "[slecrecy is
sometimes a cause of sin."40 Falsehood in accusation, in any
form, calumny, collusion, and evasion, is just as difficult for
Thomas to tolerate, for each of the guiles "deceitfully hides" 41 the
truth. Thomas actually screens candidates for admission into
legal practice by assessing the candidate's character in relation
to truth or falsity. Personal defects of the soul should be a basis
for exclusion from the legal profession. Those already in the
profession will be "debarred" 42 if found dishonest. "[P ersons of ill
repute, unbelievers, and those who have been convicted of
grievous crimes" 43 are unbecoming44 candidates for the lawyerly
arts. Thomas's lawyer represents the completely virtuous person
who possesses the functional skills necessary to advocate legal
claims and "those who are defective in these points, are
altogether debarred from being advocates either in their own or
in another's cause."45 Thomas identifies various strategies of
plaintiff and defense litigation, of diverse approaches in the
delivery of witness testimony, and of the means adopted to save
one's life or freedom, all of which are falsehoods that he labels as
"sins committed against justice."46 In each of these contexts,
cum omne mendacium sit peccatum, ut supra dictum est, consequens est etiam
quod omnis simulatioest peccatum.
37 See id. Q. 60, Art. 3, at 1448.
38 Id.
39 Id. Art. 4, at 1449.

Id. Q. 66, Art. 3, at 1478.
Id. Q. 68, Art. 3, at 1488.
Id. Q. 71, Art. 2, at 1497.
Id. at 1498.
See id.
Id. Qui in his defectum patiuntur,omnino prohibentur ne sint advocati
nec pro se, nec pro aliis.
46 Id. Q. 69.
40

41
42
43
44
45
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truth is the standard bearer
critiqued.
A.

and falsehood is

No. 3

scathingly

Defense Counsel and Defendants

Lawyers confront the horrid landscape of falsehoods more in
criminal defense work than in any other area in the legal process.
In criminal cases, defendants are often on the block for fines,
incarceration, restitution, or other restriction. Counsel is hired
or assigned, as Gilson points out, to "defend them as skillfully as
he can, never resorting to falsehoods but allowing himself those
7
ruses and reservations necessary for the triumph of justice."4
Intentional falsehoods are never tolerated by Thomas, but a
masterful defense is integral to the aims of justice. As a
defendant, Thomas ascribes no quality of falsehood in silence, in
a refusal to incriminate oneself, and in a defense strategy that
employs "lawful means, and such as are adapted to the end in
view, which belongs to prudence,"48 nor to give testimony on
questions the defendant has no obligations to answer. "St.
Thomas wisely concludes that a good defendant, while he may
prudently hide impeding evidence, should not resort to
falsehood." 49 Lawyers advising caution in defense testimony, a
lack of cooperation regarding a confession, or a lawful nondelivery of incriminating evidence are not engaged in falsehood.
Instead, Thomas perceives this conduct as "praiseworthy,"50 for
the defense is not based upon "calumnies"1 but upon prudence.
Western legal tradition culminating in the constitutionalism of
the American colonies, specifically at the Fifth Amendment's
prohibition on self-incrimination, rests side by side with
Thomistic legal theory.
On the other hand, the line to aggressive defense can
transform into patent falsehood-a situation never pleasing to
Thomas. "But it is unlawful for him, either to utter a falsehood,
or to withhold a truth that he is bound to avow, or to employ
guile or fraud, because fraud and guile have the force of a lie, and
47 GILSON, supra note 17, at 320.
4s AQUINAS, supra note 1, Q. 69, Art. 2, at 1490.
49 E. K. RAND, CICERO IN THE COURTROOM OF ST.

THOMAS AQUINAS 48-49

(1946) (describing the tenets of Cicero that Thomas used in his court).

AQUINAS, supra note 1, Q. 69, Art. 2, at 1490.
51 Id. (stating that since one should not defend with calumnies, the
allegations should also be made without calumnies).
50
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so to use them would be to defend oneself with calumnies."52
The terminal nature of the death penalty would lead most to
the conclusion that the lie would be an exception to Thomas's
resistance to falsehood. Even here, Thomas does not tolerate the
falsehood to save the bodily flesh, but condemns that body to
death in order to assure the salvation of the soul. It is justice's
reciprocity that can only come to fruition upon execution, and to
prevent its imposition in a defense tactic achieves the status of a
"sin." God ordains "the punishment of evil-doers"53 (in quo est
divinitus instituta ad vindictam malefactorum). The man at the
gallows cannot fight, lie, or defend himself with calumny or other
deception. Lies and falsehoods cause injury to the judicial
process according to Thomas:
To lie, with injury to another person, in order to rescue a
man from death is not a purely officious lie, for it has an admixture of the pernicious lie: and when a man lies in court
in order to exculpate himself, he does an injury to one
whom he is bound to obey, since he refuses him his due,
5
namely an avowal of the truth. 4
Using the judicial process to every advantage is not a
falsehood in any sense.
Lawyers' conduct as advocates is
typically constrained by the rules of civil and criminal procedure,
evidence, and the appellate process. These types of rules set
forth professional parameters. To argue within them in the most
vigorous of styles would not be surreptitious, but prudential. At
one locus in the Summa Theologica, Thomas refers to appeals
from judgments. At issue is whether this type of juridical process
is, or has the potential to be, filed from false motives. Surely, if
an appeal is filed for purposes of delay and contentiousness, the
appeal merely compounds injustice. But if filed for a legitimate
cause, the appeal is characterized by Thomas as a "prudent

52 Id.
Q. 69, Art. 2, at 1491. Non autem licet ei vel falsitatem dicere, vel
veritatem tacere quam confiteri tenetur, neque etiam aliquem dolum vel fraudem
adhibere, quia fraus et dolus vim mendacii habent; et hoc est calumniose se
defendere.
53 Id. Art. 4, at 1492, sed contra.
54 Id. Art. 2, at 1490. Quod mentiri, ad liberandum aliquem a morte cum
injura alterius, non est mendacium simpliciterofficiosum, sed habet aliquid de
pernicioso admixtum. Cum autem aliquis mentitur in judicio ad excusationem
sui, injuriam facit ei cui obedire tenetur, dum ipsi denegat quod ei debet, scilicet
confessionem veritatis.
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means of escape."55 The lawfulness of the process, whether
appeal or otherwise, is imputed in the motive. Appeals also serve
as a potential remedy or bulwark against unjust oppression or
arbitrary decision-making.56
In the final analysis, the fraudulent will reap the fruits of
their deception and simultaneously deliver an injustice to the
client and the justice system as a whole. Thomas dramatically
conveys that "[t]hose who commit frauds, do not design anything
against themselves or their own souls; it is through God's just
judgment that what they plot against others, recoils on
themselves, according to Ps. vii. 16, He is fallen into the hole he
made."57
B.

Counsel and Witnesses
The delivery of testimony by witnesses is another critical
junction for lawyers advocating cases.
Witnesses, while
independent of counsel, are closely tied to the advice of counsel,
and intently listen to their commands and exhortations.
Litigation manuals and advocacy treatises spend considerable
time examining the role, function, and scope of witness testimony
and how lawyers lead in its preparation.5 8 That preparation will
consist of a factual review, determining the breadth and depth of
testimonial subject matter, tactics for fielding the onslaught of
direct or cross-examination, and generic suggestions on truthtelling and obligations to the court. Universally evident in the
witness-lawyer relationship is a witness's deep dependence upon
the instruction of counsel and the need for advice on how to
proceed testimonially. For this reason, the deception perpetrated
by a witness can possibly be imputed to counsel's preparation. At
a minimum, a deceptive witness should be ferreted out by
counsel since candor before the tribunal is mandatory.
Thomas understands the interplay between lawyer and
55 Id. Art. 3, at 1491 (stating that a man should submit to a lower authority
only where the lower authority does not depart from the order of the higher).
56 See id.
57 Id. Q. 55, Art. 5, at 1424. Quod illi qui fraudes faciunt, ex eorum
intentione non moliuntur aliquid contra seipsos, vel contra animas suas: sed ex
justo Dei judicio provenit ut id quod contra alios moliuntur, contra eos
retorqueatur,secundum illud (Psalm.VII, 16): Incidit in foveam quam fecit.
58 See generally CHARLES P.
NEMETH,
LITIGATION,
PLEADINGS
AND
ARBITRATION (2d ed. 1997); LAWRENCE S. CHARFOOS & DAVID W. CHRISTENSEN,
PERSONAL INJURY PRACTICE: TECHNIQUE AND TECHNOLOGY (1995).
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client, lawyer and court, and client and court when dealing with
matters of testimonial disclosure. Already noted is the right of
the criminal to not be compulsed as a witness, and that the lack
of testimony in the form of a non-participatory silence cannot be
declared unlawful. 59 Thomas writes "[withholding the truth"
that the witness "is not bound to avow"60 is not falsehood or
calumny. So, counsel may instruct a witness that testimony is
not required despite the witness having knowledge of the truth or
falsity of the subject matter. This litigation tactic is termed
prudent by Thomas.61 Also instructive is Thomas's suggestion
that a witness "not lay bare his own guilt,"62 nor be subject to
compelled testimony by a judge, who is not granted the power to
examine, unless his guilt is "unmasked by another" to whom he
is bound and obligated to answer. 63 It is only when that witness
stands upright and announces to the world their innocence when
the truth is otherwise that a legal falsehood is born. There are
and will be cases when the "accused is not bound to satisfy"64 the
judge or other authority.
Counsel who recommends nonincriminatory silence is attentive to Thomas's distinction
between the substantive, affirmative falsehood, which is
categorically wrong, and the legitimate reason to not testify
under questioning. A criminal defendant must answer a judge
pertaining to that which the judge is lawfully allowed to ask.
But the defendant may remain silent if the judge inquires about
that which "he cannot ask in accordance with the order of
justice."65
The relationship between a witness and the lawyer/advocate
is a cumbersome and complicated one. In one way, Thomas
exhorts truth.
In another way, however, he respects the
processes of adjudication as either limiting, expanding, or
nullifying testimonial evidence. With wit and foresight, Thomas
59 See AQUINAS, supra note 1, Q.69, Art. 2.
60 Id. Art. 2, at 1490-91.
61 See id. ("lit is lawful for the accused to defend himself by withholding
the truth that he is not bound to avow, by suitable means, for instance by not
answering such questions as he is not bound to answer. This is not to defend
himself with calumnies, but to escape prudently.").
62 Id. Art. 1, at 1490 (explaining that it is not a falsehood to withhold the
truth until it is extracted by someone else, but it is a falsehood to affirm
innocence upon extraction when one is in fact guilty).
63

Id.

64 Id.
65

Id.
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expects the witness, the client, and his or her lawyer to test the
legal waters with an aggressive, professional posture coupled
with moral virtue. Witnesses are not empty shells spouting off
whatever is fed their psyches. Witnesses, particularly those in
peril of life and limb, should be more than lambs led to the
slaughter, resigned and pessimistic, showing no resistance. In
the ebb and flow of litigation and the dynamic of judges, lawyers,
and parties, truth is not a rubber stamp, but a blend of both facts
and law, of both substance and process. Thomas challenges the
witness, the defendant especially, to use his or her intellectual
arsenal. When dealing with the acceptable means to avoid the
death penalty, Thomas urges the human actor to utilize his wits
and tactical insight to defend oneself against death, "but only
such as is accomplished with due moderation"66 (sed solum quae
fit cum debito moderamine).
Thomas's analysis of witnesses extends to questions of
quality-the reliability and credibility of the purported
testimony. Counsel's review of prospective testimony is a search
for the reliability of what will be said, as well as its credibility;
that quality of truth and falsity which renders or devalues
testimonial evidence. Counsel filters the evidence in the initial
interview by cross-checking, corroborative fact-finding, and other
scrutiny. The lawyer who accepts testimony at face value is not
performing this basic task. Even a story that is innocently
offered without malicious or sinister motives may still lack
credibility. Lawyers who utilize testimony that results from
faulty memory, defect of reason, or confused perceptions are also
failing in their primary duties. Thomas stresses the need for this
type of testimonial quality control, resisting every level of doubt
in the evaluation of a witness's presentation, but mindful that
human beings have certain faults or inconsistencies in their
recollection. Only false testimony directly and intentionally (per
se et ex intentione) delivered is condemned.67
The concern for testimonial quality can be detected in
Thomas's discussion of evidentiary sufficiency.
When is
testimonial evidence to be believed? What should counsel do to
Id. Art. 4, at 1492.
See id. Q. 70, Art. 4, at 1496 (stating, "111f after thinking over the matter
with due care he deems himself certain about that false thing, he does not sin
mortally if he asserts it, because the evidence which he gives is not directly and
intentionally, but accidentally contrary to what he intends.").
66
67
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assure the believability and integrity of witness testimony? A
witness who contradicts his testimony over a central, material
matter necessitates the need for a greater number of witnesses.
Otherwise, the evidence is to be deemed unworthy of belief. On
most material issues or facts, Thomas urges the examiner to pay
strict attention to overall credibility. On the other hand, Thomas
asserts that witnesses can and do forget certain things. The
materiality of evidence gauges the seriousness, or lack thereof, of
the falsehood. Credibility is measured by essential, material
questions of fact, not "whether the weather were cloudy or fine,
whether the house were painted or not, or such like matters,
such discrepancy does not weaken the evidence, because men are
not wont to take much notice of such things, wherefore they
easily forget them."68 Inaccuracy relating to minor, immaterial
details does not make the witness's testimony inadmissible.
This distinction between material evidence and irrelevant or
immaterial subject matter is a perpetual caveat to counselors-atlaw who weigh and evaluate the quality and content of
testimony. Witnesses who are deplorably inconsistent in their
recitations should not be the basis for any action in law.
Punishments, findings of guilt or innocence, damage awards, and
requests for legal or equitable remedies should stand on a
foundation of evidentiary reliability, testimonial or not. Lawyers
are obliged to: sift through the evidentiary deposit, assure justice
in the legal marketplace and, even more poignantly, the call of
salvation of those testifying. Giving testimony is not purely a
functional exercise, but guarantees that due process and a
substantive grounding exist in the case.69
To allow witnesses to testify, either knowing or reasonably
suspecting their lack of integrity, is to advance an injustice.
Corrupt testimony is a "deformity"70 in three ways. First, it
affronts the oath of the testifier and causes perjury in the
courtroom. Second, since every falsehood is a violation of justice,
68 Id. Art. 2, at 1495. Si tempus fuerit nubilosum vel serenum, vel si domus
fuerit picta, aut non, aut aliquid hujusmodi; talis discordia non praejudicat
testimonio; quia homines non consueverunt circa talia multum sollicitari, unde
facile a memoria elabuntur.
69 See id. Art. 3, at 1496 (stating, "To give evidence is necessary for
salvation, provided the witness be competent, and the order of justice observed."
(Quod testificari est de necessitate salutis, supposita testis idoneitate, et ordine
juris.))
70 Id. Art. 4, at 1496.
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it is a "mortal sin generically"71 (peccatum mortale). Lastly, even
if not mortal in design, Thomas characterizes each and every lie
as a sin 72 (quod omne mendacium est peccatum). Falsehood at
every juncture in law and life itself is contrary to justice, and it
behooves the lawyer to screen and test the testimony witnesses
are to relay. For all falsehood, lying, and perjury is a mockery
and slander to the judicial process, an infamy, an irreverence to
God, 73 and a contempt of God.7 4
IV. SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS OF THE LAWYER/ADVOCATE

Aside from these general prescriptions of truth that mold
both man and counselor, Thomas perceives certain unique
obligations in the legal profession.
As in the defense or
prosecution of a case, it is not enough to be functional as a
lawyer/advocate. More relevant to Thomas is the law's proper
ends and the means chosen by a lawyer to obtain those ends.
Throughout this Article, we have repeatedly witnessed the
melding of the law as a human enactment and the law in a
teleological sense. The profession's subject matter places special
demands upon lawyers beyond the grind and battles of daily
practice. To be in law mandates that the lawyer engage in just
activities in the courtroom and outside its hallowed halls.
Thomas, displaying his prophetic foresight, preempts the
twentieth century's concept of social justice and pro-bono legal
practice.
A.

Legal Practiceas a Work of Mercy
Responding to whether or not a lawyer is obligated to
represent the poor, Thomas pragmatically integrates the corporal
works of mercy into legal practice. Suits of the poor do not
mandatorily oblige the legal professional, 75 but a lawyer cannot
71

Id.

See id. ("Thirdly, owing to the falsehood itself, by reason of which every
lie is a sin.").
73 See id. Q. 98, Art. 3, at 1618 (describing that, "[Ilt is an irreverence
towards God.").
74 See id. (explaining, "[Aln action which is, by reason of its very nature, a
venial sin, or even a good action, is a mortal sin if it be done out of contempt of
God.").
75 See id. Q. 71, Art. 1, at 1497 ("Therefore neither is an advocate always
bound to defend the suits of the poor.").
72
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in every instance shun this need. Realizing that human needs
are not exclusively physical, in the sense of nourishment or
clothing, Thomas perceives a parallel need in bodily sustenance
and the imperative of the advocate.76 Further on, Thomas
intimates that those of talent and blessings and in life's better
station should not forget those in graver conditions since every
man and woman is "bound to make good use of the talent
bestowed on him, according to the opportunities afforded by time,
place, and other circumstances. . ...77 Recognizing that Christian
charity is balanced with: occupational capacity, economic
realities, familial demands, and a never-ending stream of those
in need, Thomas demands a contribution, not a lifelong
obligation, "else he would have to put aside all other business,
and occupy himself entirely in defending the suits of poor people.
The same applies to a physician with regard to attendance on the
sick."78 No one lawyer can be encumbered with all of life's
misery. To take on every suit of the poor would be a recipe for
professional and personal destruction.
The lawyer, however, cannot escape the charitable
responsibilities of the good life, and while circumstances amongst
lawyers may differ, each advocate is capable of making a
contribution to less fortunate litigants. When evaluating the
propriety of lawyers' fees, Thomas again reminds practitioners
that when setting their fees, they should be cognizant of human
misery and its costs. Thomas suggests that doing merciful things
for others reaps not a monetary reward, but divine applause.
Accordingly, "when a man does give a thing out of mercy, he
should seek, not a human, but a Divine reward. In like manner
an advocate, when he mercifully pleads the cause of a poor man,
should have in view not a human but a Divine need; and yet he is
not always bound to give his services gratuitously."79 At the
76 See id. ("He that lacks food is no less in need than he that lacks an
advocate." (Non minor necessitas est indigentis cibo quam indigentisadvocato)).
77 Id. Quod homo talentum sibi creditum tenetur utiliter dispensare,servata
opportunitatelocorum et temporum, et aliarum rerum, ut dictum est.
78 Id. Alioquin oporteret eum omnia alia negotia praetermittere, et solis
causis pauperumjuvandis intendere. Et idem dicendum est de medico quantum
ad curationempauperum.
79 Id. Art. 4, at 1499. Sed quando eam misericorditer impendit, non
humanam, sed divinam remunerationem quaerere debet. Et similiter advocatus
quando causae pauperum misericorditer patrocinatur, non debet intendere
remunerationem humanam sed divinam; non tamen semper tenetur gratis
patrocinium impendere.

40

CATHOLIC LAWYER,

No. 3

same time, the merciful lawyer looks at his accounts and to his
business ledger so that legal charity will not dissipate the
lawyer's livelihood. Gilson speaks rightly of this balance between
charitable delivery of legal service and the maintenance of a legal
practice noting that "[a] lawyer or doctor who spent their time
looking for indigents would find their clientele growing too
rapidly for their income."80
B.

Confidentiality

In confidentiality analysis a privilege exists; a protection
against divulsion of certain evidence whether it is testimonial or
of other form. Reviewed thus far is the right not to be compelled
to testify against onself or be forcibly made to give testimony.
During Thomas's era there was, and still is, an understanding of
the privileges that existed between a priest/penitent and, to some
extent, a lawyer/client. Privileges exist because of a general
interest in fostering truth and honest discussion between the
parties. Secrecy, for Thomas, has dual qualities-that of fidelity
and guile. Fidelity is loyalty to another not to divulge what has
been conditionally spoken, with the implied and express promise
not to disclose its content. In fidelity we see the essence of
human honor. Thomas briefly comments that "[i]t is contrary to
fidelity to make known secrets to the injury of a person."81
Fidelity embraces the loyalty of one to another, not only in a
professional sense, but in friendship and familial bonds. Thomas
labels fidelity as a basis for not being bound to give evidence:82
"Against such a duty a man cannot be obliged to act on the plea
that the matter is committed to him under secrecy, for he would
break the faith he owes to another."83
Privilege in the confessional is sanctimoniously and
unreservedly protected by Thomas since the sacrament of
confession "is more binding than any human precept."84 In this
instance, the truth of the conversation between the privileged
80 GILSON, supra note 17, at 320.
81 AQUINAS, supra note 1, Q. 68, Art. 1, at 1486. Quod revelare secreta in

malum personae, est contra fidelitatem.
82 See id. Q. 70, Art. 1 at 1493-94 ("Against such a duty a man cannot be
obliged to act on the plea that the matter is committed to him under secrecy, for
he would break the faith he owes to another.").
83 Id. Et contra hoc debitum obligari non potest per secreti commissum, qua
in hoc frangeret fidem quam alteri debet.
84 Id. at 1493.
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parties can be withheld from legal authority since the protection
and content of the privilege outweighs the need for the evidence.
Hiding information under the guise of privilege does not always
infer guile, except when the party asserting the privilege
"deceitfully hides the matter about which he makes the
accusation.85
CONCLUSION

Consistent with Thomas's world view of human activity and
law, lawyers are expected to act in accordance with their
essential nature, with reason being their rule and measure.
Thomas's lawyer is implanted with self-evident propositions, the
primary tenet of the natural law-doing good and avoiding evil,
and its per se nota, first principles, from self-preservation to
procreation, as well as a panoply of secondary precepts. The
Thomistic lawyer acts justly, gives everyone his or her due,
searches for equality amongst people and things, and focuses on
truth.
The Thomistic advocate engages in a sort of microscopic
inquiry most present-day lawyers would find arcane and
irrelevant. Today's lawyer treads water in a sea of positivism,
with billable hours being the prime incentive, instead of
Thomas's admonition to take only the just case and avoid
falsehoods of every form, whether personal or that of a client or
witness. To be sure, the practice of law consists of professional
function and a series of job competencies. Side by side with
function is the urgent reminder to do just things, to advocate
truth. A lawyer must shun falsehood, craftiness, guile, and
deceit, and frown upon litigation techniques that Thomas terms
The lawyer is justice
calumny, collusion and evasion.
testimonial
evidence,
inspecting
intricately
personified,
that are
and
defenses
accusations
storylines, and fashioning
supportable by law and fact.
Add to this the lawyer's obligation to himself, the court, his
colleagues and, most importantly, to God. Lawyers should offer
the advocate's skill of representation to the poor, but not as a sole
occupation, lest the lawyer remain professionally viable. They
must latch onto the law from its written anchor and proffer

85

Id. Q. 68, Art. 3, at 1488.
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arguments zealously. An advocate should prudentially examine,
defend, prosecute, and appeal the case and its parties. They
should never apologize for the tenacity of their approach but
should always be mindful of its integrity and goodness.
Thomas's lawyer is far more complicated than the prototype
molded and produced by twentieth century America's legal
education system. If the trend continues into the twenty-first
century, we will continue to observe a lawyer product that takes
on the armor of a social worker; one who helps others, cares
mostly in an individualistic sense, and is chiefly, almost
obsessively, governed by the language of individualrights. It is a
safe bet that most law schools will care little about the moral life
and more about the sensitive and caring lawyer who labors to
right all the wrongs the world suffers from, a lawyer who
perceives law, not as an ordination of reason and an expression of
virtue, but as an instrument for positive, corrective humanism.
Today, lawyers toy with law in a promulgative sense, finding
laws already on the books, or those soon to be invented in the
legal laboratory, a panacea for life's ills.
Thomas places human enactments at the bottom of his
continuum of laws. Its last place finish does not imply a shortage
of value. To the contrary, Thomas integrates and necessitates
human law86 into his entire schema. But the temptation when
working with these temporal inventions-e.g., regulations,
ordinances, statutes, and so on-is mesmerizing. Within the
modern judicial perspective, lawyers truly believe that the legal
enactment is power itself; having force inherently; being
inherently coercive. It is only a matter of time before this same
lawyer, believing in the false gods of positivism, elevates his or
her own role into a mightier, supernatural dimension. According
to Thomas, lawyers, like laws themselves, are not the architects
of justice, but servants to it. The impotence of human law and
the abject frailty of lawyers who advocate its content is obvious to
Thomas. We can only fall short of just due87 since our efforts
restore only a portion of paradise lost. Thomas never loses sight
of his place, the place of law and that of lawyers advocating in
the temples of justice.
To judge belongs to God in virtue of His own power:
86
87

Id., Vol. I, Pt. II, Q. 95, Art.1, at 1013-14.
See id., Vol. II, Q. 80, Art. 1, at 1527.
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wherefore His judgment is based on the truth which He
Himself knows, and not on knowledge imparted by others:
the same is to be said of Christ, Who is true God and true
man: whereas other judges do not judge in virtue of their
own power, so that there is no comparison.8 8

88 Id. Q. 67, Art. 2, at 1484. Quod Deo competit judicaresecundum propriam
potestatem; et ideo in judicando informatur secundum veritatem quam ipse
cognoscit, non secundum hoc quod ab aliis accipit; et eadem ratio est de Christo,
qui est verus Deus et homo.
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